how veyl protects your data
what veyl stores and can read
the app encrypts private chats, vault backups, settings, and your private chat list before upload. encrypted data needs a secret key to read. veyl’s servers store and send this data without those keys. they cannot read it or sign wallet payments. the servers can read account data and information needed to run the service.
a server attack can expose public account data, service records, and encrypted data. someone who copies a vault backup can guess its password without contacting veyl. argon2id, a password-processing method, makes each guess more costly. it does not make a weak password safe. stolen secrets, infected devices, and chat participants can also expose readable data.
1.3.6 · updated october 14, 2026
data storage
veyl stores and delivers private content without the keys to read it. some account and delivery records remain readable so the service can work.
kept on your device
veyl’s servers do not receive readable copies of this data. the sdk lets programs use veyl. account credentials and private keys stay on the computer running it. someone else may operate that computer or server.
- your vault password and unlocked seed, which supplies your private keys
- private keys for payments, chat encryption, sender checks, notifications, account changes, and local data
- readable chats, files, settings, member lists, previews, and private account data
- the wallet tool and keys that approve payments
- face id or other local biometric data
stored by veyl as encrypted data
veyl can store, send, expire, or delete this data without reading its private contents.
- your seed backup, encrypted with your vault password
- encrypted private account settings and your private chat list
- encrypted chat history, settings, messages, actions, and files
- encrypted titles, custom pictures, deletion settings, member lists, and delivery details
- chat access and notification records encrypted for each recipient
readable service data
veyl uses this data to run accounts, deliver content, protect the service, provide support, and limit abuse.
- your account id, accepted agreements, username, profile picture, and online status
- public keys, which can be shared, for chats, notifications, account changes, and the wallet
- public passkey records, login sessions, credential identifiers, and whether access was revoked
- notification destinations and registered devices
- record times, encrypted data sizes, expiry times, opaque identifiers, record counts, and delivery activity
- network requests, access logs, security events, usage limits, and temporary abuse checks
- reports, evidence, feedback, and support details that you choose to submit
if an attacker gains access
- copied database or storage
- a copied database or file store exposes readable service records and encrypted data. it also exposes times, sizes, expiry, opaque identifiers, and activity patterns. opaque identifiers do not describe private content. it does not contain readable chats or private wallet keys. an attacker can test passwords against a copied vault backup without contacting veyl. veyl’s login limits cannot stop those guesses.
- control of servers or app software
- an attacker who controls the service can pretend to be a signed-in account and change stored records. they can also change server or app software to attack future activity. control of server authentication alone does not unlock a vault. harmful app software can steal secrets when you use it. attackers can still test password guesses against copied vault backups.
- device or participant access
- an unlocked device and an admitted chat participant have readable data. end-to-end encryption cannot prevent malware, screenshots, downloads, copied secrets, or deliberate sharing on a participant’s device. an agent is a program that can use veyl. it can read messages sent to it. its operator decides whether to store them or send them to an ai model provider. veyl’s deletion settings do not erase copies held by the agent or its providers.
private chat
chat members hold the encryption keys and verify who sends each message. a membership change starts a new period, called an epoch, with new secrets.
- message body
- the app encrypts each private action once with xchacha20-poly1305, an encryption method. it uses the current epoch’s message key. the sender signs each action once with their stable ed25519 chat key. a digital signature lets a recipient check who sent an action and whether it changed. ed25519 is the signature method. encryption checks bind the action to its chat, epoch, protocol version, content identifier, encryption method, and flags.
- sender verification
- the sender and action type stay inside the encrypted data. the recipient decrypts the action and finds the sender’s signing key in that epoch’s verified member list. that list cannot change within the epoch. the recipient checks the signature before applying the action.
- membership changes
- one stable random chat identifier links all epochs. adding or removing a member, or leaving a chat, starts a new epoch. the new epoch has fresh secrets for content, settings, shared state, and delivery. new members receive no secrets from earlier epochs. removed members receive no secrets for the new epoch.
- server records
- veyl stores chat state that does not reveal private details, plus epoch identifiers. it also stores encrypted settings and one encrypted copy of each action. your private chat list and epoch history are encrypted too. it does not store readable member lists, senders, titles, pictures, action types, read receipts, reactions, deletions, or deletion settings.
- delivery
- first-contact and chat-access records are encrypted for their recipients and kept for up to 21 days. these records can reveal the verified sender and recipient routes needed for blocking and moderation. recipients register hashed access codes for established delivery. a hash is a value computed from a secret code. each established-delivery slot keeps its latest cursor, a marker that shows its delivery position. veyl does not keep an index that links established chats to their members.
- attachments
- each attachment has a fresh random file key and a separate opaque address. this address does not describe the file or its contents. its filename, media type, key, caption, and link to the message stay inside the encrypted action. veyl sees the encrypted file’s size and expiry time. it also sees public values used to check file-management permission. forwards reuse the original encrypted file, so the service can link its downloads.
- voice-call encryption
- direct calls use dtls-srtp, a method that encrypts audio between the two devices. this encryption also applies when a turn server relays the data. group calls use sframe, a method that encrypts audio before it reaches the media relay. only admitted participants who join the call hold its keys. relays can send the encrypted audio but cannot decrypt it. call access and setup messages are verified and encrypted separately from stored chat messages. direct callers can learn each other’s network addresses. participants can record what they hear.
- call records and deletion
- call services process login checks, opaque endpoint and room identifiers, network addresses, times, data volume, usage limits, and relay resource references. these identifiers locate connections and call rooms without describing their private contents. encrypted records for finding and setting up calls expire within two minutes unless renewed. update counters and records used to release relay resources can remain. call-start and call-end notices use encrypted chat records and follow message deletion rules. these limits do not set deletion deadlines for provider access logs or backups.
wallet keys and payment signing
you control the keys that approve payments. veyl stores an encrypted backup, but it cannot unlock your wallet or spend your funds.
- vault unlock
- your device processes the vault password with argon2id. it encrypts the seed backup with aes-256-gcm, an encryption method, before upload. veyl does not hold the key that unlocks this backup. a local unlock creates the keys for your wallet, chats, notifications, account signatures, and local data. password strength still matters if someone steals this backup.
- payment signing
- the veyl wallet on your device prepares and signs wallet actions. veyl does not receive your unlocked seed or authenticated wallet access. veyl has no authority to spend, freeze, reverse, recover, or move your funds.
- external visibility
- wallet network, bitcoin, internet, device, and hosting providers have their own access to data and their own deletion rules. payments published to bitcoin or another public network are visible on that network. veyl cannot erase them.
when messages are deleted
messages are deleted by default to reduce the private history that remains. deletion limits what a later attack can expose, but cannot remove copies someone already kept.
- default: after seen
- the default is deletion after everyone has seen the message. this applies to direct chats and groups with up to 32 members. the readers are the members present when the message was sent. later membership changes do not change this group. an unsaved message disappears from your device’s chat view when you close that view after those members have seen it. an open chat can keep it visible until you close the view. removing the encrypted server copy is a separate step.
- optional: 24 hours
- the optional 24-hour timer starts after those reads, when an app leaves the chat view and can save the deletion deadline. this requires no other observed connections to the chat. sending the message or receiving its first read receipt does not start the timer. later reads and reopening the chat do not extend a stored deadline.
- 21-day limit
- new unsaved messages expire within 21 days of creation under the after-seen or 24-hour setting. this also applies to unopened messages. the 21-day deadline wins if the 24-hour timer would end later. groups with more than 32 members do not expire messages based on reads. notes also use the 21-day deadline under the default setting.
- saving messages for everyone
- any current participant can save eligible messages for everyone. saved messages have no automatic expiry. any current participant can unsave or delete messages they can access. they can also delete the chat for everyone. unsaving sets a new 21-day deadline. reads can shorten that deadline. forwarded attachments and attachments that can be viewed only once cannot be saved.
- how long files remain
- saving or unsaving an original attachment changes both the message deadline and the stored file deadline. automatic after-seen or 24-hour message expiry does not shorten the separate file deadline. unsaved encrypted files may remain for up to 21 days after upload or unsaving. forwards use the original file. deleting the original attachment or its chat makes forwards unavailable unless a recipient already has a local copy.
- expiry and server cleanup
- official veyl clients hide expired messages. open chats, offline clients, or uncertain chat activity can delay setting a shorter server deadline until the 21-day limit. database cleanup runs later, so expired encrypted messages can remain available to fetch. expired or deleted files receive no new download permissions. existing permissions can last up to 15 minutes unless the file is removed sooner. background workers remove stored files later. opaque deletion records can remain. these records contain no readable private data.
- copies kept by providers
- removing data from active systems does not remove all provider copies. production file storage keeps deleted encrypted files for seven days through provider soft deletion. soft deletion keeps removed files available for recovery during that period. the production message database reports a one-hour window for keeping earlier versions. these windows do not set a deadline for removing every physical copy from provider backups or logs.
- why delete encrypted data
- short storage periods reduce the private history available after someone gains access to an unlocked account or device. they also reduce the encrypted data that someone can copy during a later server attack. an attacker can keep copied data and try to decrypt it later. stolen keys or new methods that break encryption could make this possible.
- account and group deletion
- account deletion removes your account, profile, credentials, encrypted vault, and encrypted private chat list. it also deletes notes and direct chats. group chats remain for the other participants. deleting your account does not erase their remaining group history, including saved messages. a group is deleted when its last participant leaves.
- what deletion cannot remove
- deletion cannot remove readable or encrypted copies already held by a recipient, an agent, or its ai model provider. it cannot remove content saved outside veyl or provider records kept under their own rules. evidence that you submit in reports or support requests can remain. deletion also cannot remove payments published to a blockchain, a public record of payments.